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Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2907
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 VIENNA 4653

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS
MAY 22, 1974

FROM US REP MBFR

REF: VIENNA 4651

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON MAY 22, 1974. PARAGRAPHS
1 THROUGH 2 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

3. FRG REP AS HOST INVITED EASTERN REPS TO LEAD OFF IF THEY
DESIRED. POLISH REP RESPONDED. USING PREPARED TEXT, HE SAID
EASTERN REPS HAD MADE CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF VIEWS OF THEIR WESTERN
COLLEAGUES AS EXPRESSED IN LAST INFORMAL SESSION OF MAY 15.
THEY HAD NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH ALLIED REPS HAD SINGLED OUT A
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SPECIFIC QUESTION FOR SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION, "WHOSE FORCES

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SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET," ALLIED REPS HAD PLACED THIS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL WESTERN PROGRAM. THIS WESTERN PRESENTATION OF MAY 15 HAD CONTAINED NO NEW ELEMENTS OR TENDENCIES TOWARDS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF ALL. EASTERN REPS COULD NOT AGREE MORE WITH ALLIED REFERENCES TO UN-DIMINISED SECURITY AND TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973, THAT STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE SHOULD BE ENHANCED. BUT EASTERN REPS COULD NOT AGREE TO EQUATE THESE GENERALLY AGREED OBJECTIVES WITH THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. THIS MIGHT BE THE NATO OBJECTIVE, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING COMMON OR AGREED ABOUT IT. IT BELONGED WHOLLY TO ONE SIDE. IN THE INTERESTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE FELT OBLIGED TO STATE WITH ALL CLARITY THAT THIS IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING WAS NOT REALISTIC AND COULD NOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. IF EASTERN REPS MADE THIS POINT SO CLEARLY, IT WAS BECAUSE ALLIED REPS HAD SHOWN SOME LACK OF CLARITY IN PLENARIES AND IN INFORMAL SESSIONS AS TO THE EXACT EASTERN POSITION ON THE SUBJECT.

4. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT RAN CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND REPRESENTED AN ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- ALLIED REPS EVEN ADMITTED THIS INTENTION. WESTERN ARGUMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EXISTING CORROLATION OF FORCES IN EUROPE WAS DISADVANTAGEIOUS FOR WEST AND DID NOT GUARANTEE STABILITY WERE INCORRECT. IT WAS THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES WHICH HAD ESTABLISHED THE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR STARTING THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE. ALLIED RELUCTANCE TO INCLUDE REDUCTION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES ALSO ELICITED JUSTIFIABLE CAUTION AND RESTRAINT AS REGARDS THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE WESTERN ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT THE RE-DUCTION PROCESS IN THE FIRST PHASE TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES WAS ALSO AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED PRECISE OBLI-GATIONS AS TO THE DIMENSIONS AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH PARTICIPANT. PROVISION FOR THIS WAS MADE IN THE EASTERN PLAN. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA REFUSED TO MAKE SUCH AN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT AND WISHED

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TO DELAY THEIR PARTICIPATION FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME. NOT ONLY THIS, THEY MADE THEIR PARTICIPATION SUBJECT TO PRE-CONDITIONS. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD STATED BEFORE THAT THE STATUS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED OBLIGATIONS AS WELL AS RIGHTS. THERE-FORE THE REFUSAL OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE PRECISE OBLIGATIONS AND THEIR ACTION IN POSING CONDI-TIONS FOR THEIR LATER PARTICIPATION CREATED SERIOUS DOUBTS AND WAS BLOCKING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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5. PLISH REP SAID EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED IT APPROPRIATE TO RESTATE THEIR VIEWS ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF PRINCIPLE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS. THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS EXPLICIT AND EQUITABLE. ALL EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO REDUCE ON THE BASIS PROPOSED. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL CORRESPONDED IN ALL RESPECTS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IT DID NOT AIM AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. REDUCTIONS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THEY WERE MUTUAL, COMPATIBLE IN ACTUAL VALUE AND EQUITABLE. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THIS BASIS. BUT IT WAS THE ONLY ONE ON WHICH AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY.

6. FRG REP SAID POLISH REP HAD MADE THREE MAIN POINTS IN HIS REMARKS: FIRST, HE HAD OBJECTED TO THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES. BUT THIS TOPIC WAS OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT AGREED FOR THE PRESENT SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS. SINCE THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED, HOWEVER, HE COULD REFER TO THE STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ROSE IN THAT MORNING'S PLENARY WHICH REPRESENTED THE WESTERN VIEW. SECOND, POLISH REP HAD CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO HAVE A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. ALLIES DID NOT AGREE WITH THIS, AND ALLIED REPS WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT LATER. THIRD,HUMES

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FROM US REP MBFR

POLISH REP HAD MADE THE POINT, WELL KNOWN TO ALLIES, THAT THE SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WERE NOT WILLING TO MAKE A CLEAR COMMITMENT AS TO THEIR REDUCTIONS. POLISH REP HAD CLAIMED THAT THIS LED TO A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO TAKE UP THE LAST PROBLEM FIRST. IN THE INTERESTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, IT WAS DESIRABLE TO EXPLAIN ONCE MORE WHY WEST HELD THIS POSITION. ON BASIS OF TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP CONTINUED THAT, IN THE LAST MEETING ON MAY 15, ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT THE REASONS WHY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES WERE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS ONLY AFTER US-SOVIET WITH-DRAWALS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. THESE REASONS WERE:

A. THE CONCERNS OF THE PAST 25 YEARS OVER THE POSSIBLE

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE CONTINUED STRONG AND HAD RESULTED IN UNDERSTANDABLE DOUBTS. THESE DOUBTS COULD BE RESOLVED ONLY THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL INITIAL REDUCTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH IT, THE UNITED STATES.

B. THERE WERE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THE US AND THE USSR, AND THAT OF MOST WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US: POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS WOULD AFFECT ONLY A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE FORCES OF THE US AND THE USSR, AND EVEN SO, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER FORMS OF REDUCTION. THE SITUATION OF MOST OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT ONE. THEIR ENTIRE TERRITORIES LAY WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT.

C. THESE WERE THE REASONS WHY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WERE NOT PREPARED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES UNTIL AFTER THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE FOR DOING SO HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS CONFIDENCE WOULD BE CREATED BY PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING AS THE OVERALL GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT, IN THIS SENSE, ALLIES HAD POINTED

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OUT TO EAST GHAT THE UAY YO WEST EUROPEZGCTIONS WAS
THROUGH A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AIMED AT
A CTMON CEILING. ALLIES HAD MENTIONED TO EAST THAT
THEY HAD ALREADY PRESENTED ENOUGH DETAIL ON THEIR TWO-PHASE
PROPOSAL TO INDICATE ITS USEFULNESS AND WORKABILITY. THE
MAIN POINTS ALLIES HAD MADE ABOUT THEIR TWO-PHASE PROGRAM
WERE:

A. ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING OF GROUND
FORCES AND HAD SUGGESTED A LEVEL OF 700,000 TROOPS ON
EACH SIDE TO BE REACHED IN TWO PHASES AND HAD IDENTIFIED
THE CURRENT OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES.
IN THIS WAY, ALLIES HAD GIVEN EAST THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS
OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR BOTH SIDES.

B. ALLIES HAD SAID THAT A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD
HAVE A PROVISION CONTAINING A COMMITMENT TO A SECOND
PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

C. ALLIES HAD SAID THAT THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD START WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER A

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SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AN
AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

8. POLISH REP ASKED WHETHER THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME
WOULD START AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT OR AFTER ITS IMPLEMENTATION. FRG REP SAID THIS
WAS A POINT WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED, BUT IN GENERAL THE
PERIOD WOULD START AFTER THE CONCLUSION AND NOT IMPLEMEN-
TATION. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIES HAD PROPOSED THAT
THE ACTUAL DURATION OF THIS FIXED PERIOD OF TIME WOULD BE
AGREED DURING THE PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS AND SPECIFIED IN
A PHASE I AGREEMENT. POLISH REP ASKED WHEN THE SECOND PHASE
WOULD ACTUALLY BEGIN. FRG REP SAID THE ACTUAL DURATION OF
THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED.

9. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIES HAD INDICATED THAT ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE COMMON CEILING. ALLIES HAD
MADE CLEAR THAT, AS REGARDS THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION, REDUCTIONS
IN THAT SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THZ
US. TAKEN TOGETHER,
THESE POINTS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO
EMMIT ITPO A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, IN WHICH ITS
CONTRIBUTIONS WTULD FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF THE GROUND FORCES
OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIHANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND TO FIX
THE POINT AT WHICH THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS SECOND PHASE
WOULD BEGIN. ALLIES CONSIDERED THEIR APPROACH BOTH PRACTICAL
AND FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY.

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10. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT, AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION LAST WEDNESDAY, ALLIED REPS HAD SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE PRESENT SESSION, PARTICIPANTS SHOLD CONTINUE WITH THE ATTEMPT TO DEFINE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WESTRN CONCEPT OF PHASING AND SEEK ANSWERS TO THEM. AWLIES HAD COMMENTED TO EAST AHAT THEY CONSIDERED THE MEASURES ON PHASING ALLIES HAD ALREADY PUT FORWARD REPRESENTED A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, BUT THAT IF THERE WERE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF EAST COULD DEFINE THEM FOR ALLIES AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT TO EAST THAT, WHERE THE EAST IS IN A

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POSITION TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE ALLIED PROGRAM, THIS WAS A PRODUCTIVE APPROACH WHICH MIGHT ENABLE MOVEMENT. ALLIED REPS HOPED PARTICIPANTS COULD USE THE PRESENT SESSION TO MAKE SOME FORWARD MOVE-MENT TOWARDS AGEEEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

11.FRG REP SAID HE WAS NOT DETERRED BY POLISH REP'S OPENING REMARKS WHICH HAD DEFENDED THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE BASIS OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES. HE WOULD LIKE TO DEAL WITH PRACTICAL ISSUES IN THE SENSE JUST STATED. ONE PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH ALLIED APPROACH TO PHASING WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD MENTIONED ON THE LAST OCCASION AND HAD ALSO MENTIONED DURING PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS,

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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FROM US REP MBFR

AND IN AMBASSADOR OESER'S REMARKS THAT MORNING, WAS EASTERN CONTENTION THAT, IF ALLIED PHASING APPROACH WERE ADOPTED, THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WOULD NOT REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN PHASE I, WOULD REMAIN FREE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES PENDING CONCLUSION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. FRG REP ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AS EAST SAW IT.

12. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ANSWER FRG REP'S QUESTION, BUT WISHED FIRST TO ASK A SPECIFIC QUESTION BASED ON FRG REP'S PRESENTATION. FRG REP HAD JUST SPOKEN OF ALLIED IDEA OF THE COMMON SEILING OF 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE. FRG REP HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE FIGURES FOR THE OVERALL STRENGTHS OF BOTH SIDES. EASTERN REPS WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE OVERALL FIGURES WEST HAD GIVEN IN LAST
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ROUND OF TALKS. AT THE VERY END OF THE SECOND ROUND, PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF GROUND FORCES. AT THAT TIME IT BECAME CLEAR THAT, IN ESTIMATING THE TOTAL GROUND MANPOWER OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IN ONE CASE ALLIES HAD INCLUDED AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL, WHILE IN ANOTHER CASE, ALLIES HAD FAILED TO DO SO. AT THAT TIME PARTICIPANTS HAD ESTABLISHED THAT IN ESTIMATING THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE USSR, ALLIES HAD INCLUDED IN THIS TOTAL THE MANPOWER OF THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES. ALLIES HAD ALSO INCLUDED AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN THE TOTAL OF US FORCES. BUT IN GIVING THE FIGURES OF THE TOTAL GROUND FORCE STRENGTH IN THE AREA OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRG, NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM, THE ALLIES HAD NOT INCLUDED AIR DEFENSE FORCES. ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY HAD MERELY FOLLOWED THE UNIFORM STRUCTURE AND, FOR EXAMPLE, AS FAR AS FRG PERSONNEL WERE CONCERNED, THEY HAD NOT INCLUDED TWO DIFFERENT CATEGORIES,

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ONE WHICH WAS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE AIR FORCE, AND A SECOND GROUP OF AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL BECAUSE IT TOO WAS IN THE AIR FORCE.

13. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD FOLLOWED CONSISTENT PRACTICE OF INCLUDING IN THE GROUND FORCES THOSE PERSONNEL IN THE ARMY OF EACH SIDE. SOVIET REP SAID HE WISHED TO RECALL THE COURSE OF THE PREVIOUS DISCUSSION TO ALLIED PARTICIPANTS. THE QUESTION HAD COME UP AS TO WHAT ALLIES MEANT WITH THE TOTAL FIGURES THEY HAD GIVEN, 925,000 FOR THE WARSAW PACT, AND 777,000 FOR NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT THEN LATER IT EMERGED THAT IN ESTIMATING WARSAW PACT STRENGTH, THE ALLIES HAD INCLUDED AIR DEFENSE AS PART OF SOVIET FORCES AND ALSO INCLUDED THIS ELEMENT IN US FORCES BUT NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE COMPARABLE FORCES OF BELGIUM. THIS WAS BECAUSE, UNDER THE ALLIED APPROACH, THESE PERSONNEL BELOGED TO THE AIR FORCE. AT THAT TIME, THE EAST HAD SAID THAT IF ONE WERE STUDYING THE QUESTION IN SPECIFIC TERMS, ONE SHOULD HAVE A SPECIFIC IDEA OF WHAT WAS INCLUDED UNDER GROUND FORCES. BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT IF THE WEST DID NOT INCLUDE THESE AIR DEFENSE TROOPS, THEY WOULD HAVE A LOWER NATO TOTAL AS A RESULT. HE WOULD ESTIMATE THIS TYPE OF FORCE IN NATO AT PRESENT IN THE TENS OF THOUSANDS. ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A SPECIFIC QUESTION WITH REGARD TO FIGURES. WHEN FRG REP WAS MENTIONING OVERALL

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TOTALS, WAS HE REFERRING TO OLD OR TO NEW FIGURES?

14. FRG REP STATED THAT ALLIES HAD EXPLAINED AT THE TIME THAT THEY HAD INCLUDED IN THE FIGURES OF TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCES EVERYONE WHO BELONGED TO THE GROUND FORCES AND WHO WORE THE GROUND FORCE UNIFORM. THE SAME PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN APPLIED TO EACH SIDE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE GDR, THEIR AIR DEFENSE WAS IN THE AIR FORCE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE NATO TOTAL FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER DIFFERENCES OF THIS TYPE. FOR EXAMPLE, US ARMY HELICOPTER PERSONNEL HAD BEEN COUNTED IN THE GROUND FORCES. IN THE CASE OF THE USSR, COMPARABLE PERSONNEL BELONGED IN THE AIR FORCE AND HAD THEREFORE NOT BEEN COUNTED. FRG REP SAID THAT ONE SHOULD NOT DIGRESS TOO MUCH AND SHOULD REVERT TO THE AGREED SUBJECT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

15. US REP CONFIRMED ALLIES WERE USING SAME FIGURES AS HERETOFORE IN ESTIMATING TOTAL REDUCTIONS. ALLIES AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. THIS ISSUE DEFINITELY BELONGED TO THE CATEGORY OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. IF THE EAST HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH WESTERN DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, ALLIES WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH AN AGREED DEFINITION.

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16. SOVIET REP SAID THAT ON THIS OCCASION HE HAD MERELY WISHED TO CLARIFY A SPECIFIC POINT MADE BY FRG REP. AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT ANY SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL MILITARY ELEMENTS ON EACH SIDE. SO WHEN IT EMERGED THAT PART OF ALLIED TROOPS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES, THE RESULT WAS THAT THE ALLIES MUST HAVE WRONG NUMBERS FOR THEIR TOTALS. IF ONE WERE TO INCLUDE THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF AIR DEFENSE IN THE GROUND FORCES ON ONE SIDE AND NOT ON THE OTHER, THE RESULT WOULD BE INCORRECT FIGURES THAT IS WHY HE HAD ASKED WHETHER FRG REP HAD IN MIND OLD FIGURES OR NEW ONES. HE HAD MERELY ASKED THE QUESTION IN ORDER TO HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF FRG REP'S REMARKS.

17. FRG REP COMMENTED THAT THE EASTERN SIDE HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO PHASING IN PAST DIS-

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CUSSIONS AND ASKED WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASE OF FORCES BETWEEN THE PHASES WAS SUCH A DIFFICULTY OF THIS TYPE. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT IF ALLIES NARROWED DOWN THE WHOLE PROBLEM TO THIS PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY, EITHER THEY HAD NOT LISTENED TO EASTERN POSITION OR EAST HAD FAILED TO EXPLAIN ITSELF CLEARLY. THIS ISSUE WAS ONLY 1/50TH, 1/100TH OF THE EASTERN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ALLIED PHASING APPROACH, ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE DIFFICULTIES EAST HAD WITH THE WESTERN POSITION. IF ONE WERE TO SEEK TO NARROW DOWN EASTERN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THIS ONE PARTICULAR PROBLEM, THAT WOULD BE A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN POSITION. SO FOR THIS REASON, THERE WAS EVIDENTLY A NEED FOR THE EAST TO EXPLAIN ITS OVERALL VIEWS ONCE MORE IN SOME DETAIL.

18. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD NOT SAID THAT THEHUMES

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FROM US REP MBFR

ISSUE OF POSSIBLE INCREASE BETWEEN PHASES WAS THE ONLY PROBLEM OR THE SINGLE MAIN PROBLEM EAST HAD WITH WESTERN PHASING APPROACH, BUT THAT IT WAS A PROBLEM THAT EASTERN REPS OFTEN REFERRED TO. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS CORRECT. IT WAS ONLY ONE OF THE PROBLEMS EAST HAD WITH ALLIED APPROACH. IN EXPLAINING THE EASTERN POSITION, EASTERN REPS HAD ATTEMPTED TO TELL WESTERN REPS WHAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH WERE. THE RIGHT TO INCREASE FORCES BETWEEN THE PHASES WAS IN FACT ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS FAULTY.

19. FRG REP SAID PARTICIPANTS SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THIS PROBLEM THAT EAST HAD RAISED MANY TIMES WAS ONE OF THE PROBLEMS EAST HAD WITH WESTERN PHASED APPROACH, AND IN FACT ONE OF THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES THE EAST HAD IN RELATION TO THE WESTERN PHASED APPROACH.

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20. USING A FORMULATION APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP CONTINUED TO DAY THAT ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THIS ISSUE. IN THIS SENSE, HE COULD TELL EASTERN REPS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSAL AND IF THERE WAS SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES, THE ALLIES MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A FORMULA WHICH WOULD MEET THIS CCONCERN. SUCH A FORMULA MIGHT SPECIFY THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA ON ITS SIDE

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RESULTING FROM PHASE I WITHDRAWALS. SUCH A FORMULA
WOULD COVER THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION
ALLIES HAD PROPOSED BUT, IN ANY EVENT, IT WOULD BE OF
FIXED DURATION. ITS LENGTH WOULD BE SPECIFIED LATER.
IT WOULD BE SUPERSEDED BY THE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER ACHIEVED IN THE SECOND PHASE.

21. KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY REQUESTED SEVERAL REPETITIONS
OF FRG REP'S STATEMENT AT DICTATION SPEED. FOLLOWING
INTERNAL DISCUSSION WITH EASTERN GROUP, KHLESTOV SAID
HE WANTED TO ASK FOR PARTICULARS ON ONE POINT. WOULD
SUCH A FORMULA SPECIFY THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED A
FORCE LEVEL OR THAT INDIVIDUAL NATIONS WOULD NOT EXCEED
FORCE LEVELS? DID FRG REP MEAN INDIVIDUAL STATES OF THE
OVERALL GROUPS? FRG REP SAID HE MEANT ALLIED SUGGESTION
ENVISAGED A SINGLE OVERALL LEVEL FOR EACH GROUP. KHLESTOV
ASKED WHETHER THIS THEN MEANT THAT INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS
COULD INCREASE THEIR FORCES WITHIN THIS LEVEL. FRG REP
SAID THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF OTHER PARTICIPANTS
ON THE SAME SIDE SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. KHLESTOV
ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION THAT ONE STATE COULD INCREASE ITS
FORCES IF ANOTHER DECREASED THEM. FRG REP CONFIRMED THIS.

22. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A FEW COMMENTS TO THE
REMARKS MADE BY FRG REP. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A STEP OF
THE KIND FRG REP HAD JUST DESCRIBED WOULD BE THAT, IN
CONJUNCTION WITH PHASE I WITHDRAWALS OF US AND SOVIET
FORCES, THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IN FACT
PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET BY ACCEPTING SIGNIFICANT
LIMITATIONS ON THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION..THIS WOULD EVIDENCE THE
POLITICAL WILL OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE
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IN THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE.

23. KHLESTOV SAID, IN OTHER WORDS, PARTICIPATION OF THESE
STATES IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THEIR
COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES BETWEEN THE
PHASES. US REP SAID THIS WAS CORRECT AS REGARDS PHAS I.

24. US REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD
RECEIVE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD IN FACT BE NO BUILD-UP
OF WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES TO
COMPENSATE FOR US WITHDRAWALS AGREED IN PHASE I. THIS
WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP ALSO BECAUSE WESTERN DIRECT PAR-
TICIPANTS WOULD BE UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT TO LIMIT THE
OVERALL LEVEL OF THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BEFORE
THE REDUCTIONS FORESEEN FOR PHASE I HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN
PLACE. THIS STEP WOULD THEREFORE REPRESENT AN ADVANCE
INVESTMENT ON PART OF ALLIES IN THE SUCCESS OF PHASE II.

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ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBLE COMMITMENT ALLIED REPS WERE DES-
CRIBING WOULD BE ONE TO MAINTAIN AN OVERALL LEVEL, IT
WAS A SERIOUS ONE FOR WEST BECAUSE IT WOULD INVOLVE THE
ENTIRE TERRITORIES OF MOST WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,
WHEREAS ANY FORCE LIMITATION APPOICABLE TO THE USSR
WOULD INVOLVE ONLY A PORTION OF ITS GROUND FORCES. THAT
WAS WHY ALLIES COULD ENTER ON SUCH A COMMITMENT ONLY
IF EAST FOR ITS PART WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE COMMON
CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT LOWER LEVELS OF
FORCES. BECAUSE ALLIES CONSIDERED THIS POSSIBLE ASSURANCE
AN IMPORTANT STEP, THEY EXPECTED FROM EAST SOME EQUIVALENTLY
SERIOUS INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROGRESS SO THAT
PARTICIPANTS COULD MOVE AHEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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---------- 016351
P 231540Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2911
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 8 VIENNA 4653

FROM US REP MBFR

25. HAVING IN MIND DESIRE OF AD HOC GROUP THAT ALLIED REPS
NOT GO FURTHER INTO DETAIL IN PRESENT SESSION, US REP ADDED
THAT ALLIES DID NOT INSIST ON IMMEDIATE REACTION AND WOULD

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UNDERSTAND IT IF EASTERN REPS WISHED TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO THIS ISSUE. KHLESTOV INDICATED HE WOULD PREFER TO THINK MATTER OVER FURTHER BEFORE GIVING REACTION.

26. POLISH REP SAID APOLOGETICALLY THAT HE WAS AFRAID DISCUSSION WOULD HAVE TO GO IN ZIG-ZAG PATTERN. HE WOULD HAVE TO REVERT TO AN EARLIER POINT EVEN THOUGH OTHER NEW ELEMENTS HAD NOW BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE DISCUSSION. NEVERTHELESS, HE WISHED TO COMMENT ON FRG REP'S REMARK THAT HIS OWN OPENING PRESENTATION HAD BEEN MORE RELATED TO TOPIC DISCUSSED BY UK REP IN PLENARY THAN TO ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE DISAGREED WITH THIS OBSERVATION. EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN MOTIVATED TO MAKE THESE REMARKS BECAUSE THEY

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HAD NOTED REFERENCES TO GENERAL POINTS IN ALLIED PRESENTATION DURING MAY 15 INFORMAL SESSION WHICH DID NOT BELONG TO THE SUBJECT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AS FAR AS EASTERN REPS WERE CONCERNED. HE HAD ALSO NOTED IN FRG REP'S REMARKS ON PRESENT OCCASION ABOUT THE TWO-PHASE AGREEMENT AND HIS JUSITIFCATION OF LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES THAT FRG REP HAD AGAIN REFERRED TO THE COMMON CEILING. HE THOUGHT THERE WERE TOO MANY REFERENCES TO THE COMMON CEILING. IN FACT, FRG REP HAD PRESENTED THE COMMON CEILING BOTH AS A GUARANTEE OF AND A REASON FOR PARTICIPATION FOR THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS. THAT IS WHY HE HIMSELF HAD MADE A REFERENCE TO PRE-CONDITIONS. HE BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AVOID ATTACHING PRE-CONDITIONS TO SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. THE VERY IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING WAS CONTROVERSIAL AND IT PERTAINED DIRECTLY TO THE BASIC POSITION OF BOTH SIDES AS CONCERNED REDUCTIONS. TO ASK ITS ACCEPTANCE AS A PRELIMINARY QUESTION AT THE BEGINNING WAS TOO MUCH. THE ALLIED POSITION WAS CATEGORICAL. IT AMOUNTED TO SAYING "IF YOU AGREE TO OUR PLAN, THEN WE CAN DISCUSS WHO WILL REDUCE FIRST." THIS WAS ASKING TOO MUCH. IF PARTICIPANTS WERE SUPPOSED TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE ISSUE OF WHO SHOULD REDUCE FIRST, THIS FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE DROPPED AND THE PROBLEM APPROACHED DIRECTLY.

27. U.S. REP SAID IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT ALLIES DID NOT OBJECT TO EAST'S COMMENTING ON THE COMMON CEILING BECAUSE ALLIES HAD MENTIONED IT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR VIEWS ON WHO SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. BUT IN REFERRING TO POLISH REP'S REMARKS OF PRINCIPLE, FRG REP HAD MEANT THAT THESE REMARKS HAD FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT FULL DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING WOULD COME IN THE CONTEXT OF REDUCTIONS. ALLIED REPS HAD MENTIONED COMMON CEILING IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. ALLIED HAD GIVEN POSITIVE REASONS WHY THEY BE-

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LIEVED U.S. AND SOVIET SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AND HAD SUPPLEMENTED THIS WITH REASONS WHY OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO REDUCE ONLY IN THE SECOND PHASE. FRG REP SAID ALLIES HAD RAISED ISSUE OF COMMON CEILING AS INDICATION OF LINK BETWEEN THE PHASES AND AS A WAY OF GUARANTEEING THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD TAKE PLACE.

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28. SOVIET REP SAID THAT ALTHOUGH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, DISCUSSION HAD IN FACT GONE BEYOND THESE LIMITS. HE SAW NOTHING NEGATIVE IN THIS FACT AND DID NOT WISH TO OBJECT TO IT. ALLIES HAD IN FACT DISCUSSED THEIR WHOLE PROGRAM. DURING DISCUSSION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THEY HAD TOUCHED ON THE COMMON CEILING AND ON THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS AND HAD MENTIONED THAT SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. IF ONE WANTED TO TAKE A STRICT VIEW, THESE TOPICS DID NOT FALL UNDER THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD NO OBJECTION TO RAISING THESE POINTS BECAUSE OTHER TOPICS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED IT APPROPRIATE TO RAISE THESE OTHER ISSUES SO THEY DID NOT INTEND TO COME BACK TO THIS CRITICISM. EASTERN REPS WOULD STICK TO THE AGREED HEADING. EACH PARTICIPANT WOULD PRESENT HIS VIEWS UNDER THIS HEADING INCLUDING HOW FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED. EASTERN REPS DESIRED TO ADVANCE FURTHER ARGUMENTS TO AID IN ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN POSITION. AT THE LAST SESSION THEY HAD ADVANCED A NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS BUT ONLY PART OF THEM.

29. AT REQUEST OF SOVIET REP, CZECHOSLOVAK DEPREP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE MODEST REMARK ON THE OCCASION OF HIS FIRST PARTICIPATION AT THIS TYPE OF DISCUSSION. WESTERN REPS ARGUED THAT EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS TOO COMPLICATED AND NOT WORKABLE, PARTICULARLY THE ASPECT WHICH CALLED FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. BUT IN THE PRESENT PHASE, PARTICIPANTS HAD HEARD HOW MANY DIFFICULTIES THERE MIGHT BE IN WORKING OUT AHUMES

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P R 231540Z MAY 74
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AMEMBASSY BONN
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FROM US REP MBFR

FIRST PHASE AND SECOND PHASE AND THE QUESTION OF DEFINING
WHAT WERE GROUND FORCES. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT WESTERN REPS
WERE NOT RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT THE EASTERN AGREEMENT DRAFT WAS TOO
COMPLICATED. IF ALL WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS
FROM THE OUTSET, THIS WOULD IN FACT MAKE THE JOB OF NEGO-
TIATING EASIER. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CZECHS TO ACCEPT
THE TWO-PHASE CONCEPT SINCE IT ENTIALED TOO MANY DIFFICULTIES
CONNECTED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN
REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, FOR EXAMPLE, TO EXPLAIN
TO CZECHOSLOVAK OPINION WHY THE EASTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN
REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, FOR EXAMPLE, TO EXPLAIN
TO CZECHOSLOVAK OPINION WHY THE EASTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FROM THE
OUTSET WHILE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SUCH AS THE FRG
WERE NOT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE
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REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WAS SO AMBIGUOUS AND UNCLEAR THAT WEST
SHOULD REALLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THIS
WOULD NOT COMPLICATE THE PATH, BUT MAKE IT EASIER.

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30. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO REMARKS OF CZECHOSLOVAK REP AND POLISH REP WHO HAD AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHY ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS ONCE AGAIN WOULD LIKE TO GIVE EAST A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE WESTERN POSITION OF THIS ISSUE:

31. ALLIED REPS DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW EASTERN SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF ONLY US FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE WERE REDUCED IN A FIRST PHASE. AS ALLIED REPS HAD FREQUENTLY POINTED OUT, THE US AND SOVIET UNION WERE IN A DIFFERENT POSITION FROM OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL PROPORTION OF THEIR FORCES WOULD BE AFFECTED BY REDUCTIONS. THE LARGE BULK OF THE FORCES OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN ANY WAY BY AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THIS WAS NOT TRUE FOR MOST OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPATIONS. THIS MEANS THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE IN A POSITION WHERE THEY SHOULD ALREADY HAVE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE TO PROCEED TO AGREEMENT TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AS ALLIED REPS HAD REPEATEDLY INDICATED, THIS WAS NOT THE CASE FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. FOR THEM, PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING WAS NEEDED TO GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE THAT REDUCTIONS OF THEIR OWN FORCES WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

32. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED, DOES THE SOVIET UNION REALLY BELIEVE THAT ITS SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, SUCH AS BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, OR THE FRG, DID NOT REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY A SMALL AMOUNT IN A FIRST PHASE? HE CONTINUED THAT ALLIES WERE SO IMPRESSED BY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ADVANTAGES WHICH GEOGRAPHY GIVES

TO THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IT WOULD APPEAR TO THEM THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD EVEN AFFORD TO MAKE LARGE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS WITHOUT THEREBY DIMINISHING ITS SECURITY. THIS, OF COURSE, IS NOT WHAT ALLIES WERE PROPOSING, BECAUSE WE ACCEPT THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MUTUAL. MOREOVER, UNDER THE FIRST PHASE OF EAST'S OWN PLAN, EAST HAD PROPOSED MERELY SYMBOLIC OR TOKEN REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN ARGUING FOR EASTERN APPROACH, EASTERN REPS ACKNOWLEDGED -- IN FACT, THEY HAD EVEN PUT IT FORWARD AS A POINT IN THEIR FAVOR-- THAT SUCH SYMBOLIC OR TOKEN REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT

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AFFECT THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANT ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER. EASTERN ARGUEMENT THAT FAILURE OF WEST
EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE WOULD DIMINISH
EASTERN SECURITY THUS APPEARED INCONSISTENT WITH
THEIR OWN APPROACH.

33. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN RPES WERE OF COURSE QUITE WILLING
TO DISCUSS ALL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE AGREED TOPIC OF
DISCUSSION INCLUDING OF COURSE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH
EMERGED WHEN DISCUSSING THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. BUT
THERE WERE MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH OF WHICH ACCOUNT
HAD TO BE TAKEN. ON THE EASTERN SIDE, EASTERN REPS FELT IT
WRONG TO POSE THE IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING AS A PRECONDITION
FOR SEARCH TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF WHOSE FORCES
SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS KNEW ALL
OF THE EASTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE COMMON CEILING. IT WAS AN ARTI-
FICIAL CONCEPT BECAUSE IT COMPLETELY IGNORED SUCH IMPORTANT
ASPECTS AS AIR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THUS COMPLETELY IGNORED THE
ACTUAL BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE AREA. WHEN EASTERN REPS LOOKED
AT THIS APPROACH, THEY UNAVOIDABLY FELT THAT THIS CONCEPT
WAS PROPOSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY
ADVANTAGE. IT VIOLATED A MAJOR PRINCIPLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS--
THAT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. EASTERN REPS HAD MANY TIMES
HEARD WESTERN ARGUMENTS AND ALSO SOME CLARIFICATIONS AS TO THE
SECOND PHASE. ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A 2-PHASE APPRAOCH AND
HAD GIVEN SOME NUMBERS IN THIS REGARD. EASTERN REPS HAD
INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT ACCEPT THESE NUMBERS. BUT

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
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FROM US REP MBFR

EVEN CALCULATING ON THE BASIS OF THE WEST'S OWN NUMBERS,
THIS MEANT REDUCTIONS SO UNEQUAL THAT NO ONE COULD SAY THAT
THEY COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT VIOLATING THE PRICIPLE
OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. WHEN ALLIED REPS TOLD EAST WHAT
THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO IN THE SECOND PHASE, THEY DID
NOT STATE EXPLICITLY THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO REDUCE
ABOUT 48,000 VERSUS THREE TIMES MORE ON THE EASTERN SIDE.
THE ALLIES GAVE NO ANSWER TO WHAT PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN
PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN BY EACH WESTERN PARTI-
CIPANT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE BUDESWEHR REDUCED BY 15 PERCENT,
WHO ELSE WOULD BE REDUCED, WHAT ELSE WOULD BE LEFT, OR
WOULD ALLIES CONSIDER THAT WEST
EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MUCH LESS THAN SOVIET AND
EASTERN REDUCTIONS? ALLIED REPS DID NOT MENTION THIS, BUT IT WAS
APPARENTLY SO. ALLIES COULD NOT SIMULTANEOUSLY CLAIM
THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND ASK
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EAST TO REDUCE THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT OF THE WEST'S
REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. AND IN THE FIRST PHASE, ALLIES
TOOK 25 PERCENT OF THEIR FORCES AS A BASE AND 50 PERCENT OF WARSAW
PACT FORCES AS A BASE AND PROPOSED REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL
PERCENTAGE. NETHERLANDS REP HAD JUST SAID ALLIES COULD NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD DIMINISH EASTERN
SECURITY. BUT ALLIED FIGURES DEMONSTRATED THIS POINT.
WESTERN LEADERS HAD SPOKEN OF THE BALANCE IN CENTRAL
EUROPE AND HAD SAID THERE WAS SOME IMBALANCE IN GROUND
FORCES WHICH WAS BALANCED OFF BY ALLIED AIR AND NUCLEAR
FORCES; FORCES WHICH THE ALLIES WERE NOT WILLING TO REDUCE. THESE
POINTS WERE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION
OF WHOSE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. WHATEVER THE ALLIES WERE
SUGGESTING HERE, ITS ULTIMATE SIGNIFIANCE WAS CLEAR. THE FORCES
ON ONE SIDE WHOULD BE REDUCED MUCH MORE THAN ON THE OTHER. THE
EASTERN APPROACH DID NOT HAVE THESE DEFECTS. THEORETICALLY,
ANYONE COULD SAY, " I WILL REDUCE IN DUE COURSE, BUT YOU
FELLOWS REDUCE FIRST." THE EAST COULD RAISE THE SAME DEMAND
TO WEST. BUT IF IT DID SO, THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT
MOVE ANYWHERE. PARTICIPANTS MUST FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTION. WEST COULD NOT SIMPLY SAY, "WE ARE PREPARED TO
REDUCE IF YOU REDUCE FIRST." THIS WAS NO BASIS FOR A

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MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. THE EASTERN REPS HAD DONE
THEIR BEST TO EXPLAIN THAT THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS THE ONLY
POSSIBLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO
ANYONE. EAST WAS NOT LOOKING FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IT WAS
ALSO NOT PREPARED TO GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO OTHERS.
EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO FIND A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES. THEY WERE PREPARED TO
SEARCH FOR VARIANTS, BUT ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND
RECIPROCITY. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY SHOULD
BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES.

34. US REP SAID AS REGARDS THE EASTERN ASSERTION THAT EAST
WOULD NOT HAVE SECURITY IF ALLIES' PHASE I REDUCTIONS WERE
IMPLEMENTED, ALLIES NOTED THAT, AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS
WERE FULLY IMPLEMENTED, EAST WOULD STILL RETAIN IMPORTANT
ADVANTAGES IN THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCES, TANKS AND IN
GEOGRAPHIC POSITION. EVEN AFTER THE REDUCTIONS WHICH WEST
PROPOSED FOR PHASE I, EAST WOULD STILL HAVE 110,000 MORE
GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA THAN THE WEST HAS.
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THE EAST WOULD STILL HAVE OVER TWICE THE NUMBER OF MAIN
BATTLE TANKS IN UNITS THAN THEWEST HAS. AND AT A LOWER
LEVEL OF FORCES, THE REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY OF THE TWO
SIDES WOULD BECOMEMORE IMPORTANT. THE USSR, WHICH
WAS THE MAJOR MILITARY POWER ON THE EASTERN SIDE, WOULD
STILL BE ONLY 400 MILES AWAY FROM THE EAST/WEST DIVIDING
LINE, WHEREAS THE MAIN MILITARY POWER ON THE WESTERN SIDE
WOULD BE 8 TIMES AS FAR AWAY. SO, BASED ON THESE THREE
FIGURES, ALLIES WOULD THINK EASTERN SECURITY WAS PERFECTLY
ADEQUATE AFTER PHASE 8 REDUCTIONS OF THE KIND ALLIES HAD
PROPOSED HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

35. SMIRNOVSKY SAID ALLIES HAD NOT MENTIONED AIR FORCES,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HELICOPTERS AND OTHER THINGS. ONE
MUST GO BACK TO THE ISSUE OF TH BALANCE OF FORCES:
WEST PUT ASIDE VERY IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF THE FORCE
BALANCE.BUT ONE COULD NOT DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS IGNORING IMPORTANT FORCE
ELEMENTS SUCH AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE WISHED TO REMIND
ALLIED REPS THAT IN MANY WESTERN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND
STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE BY THE AMERICAN SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, ALLIED LEADERS AGREED THAT AIR FORCES AND
OTHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS BALANCED OUT EASTERN GROUND FORCE
STRENGTH. AS FOR REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES, IT WAS
IMPROPER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AS THOUGH, IN PROCESSOF
REDUCING FORCES, PARTICIPANTS WERE CHARGED WITH PREPARING FOR
SOME CRITICAL EVENTUALITY. TO THE CONTRARY, PARTICI-
PANTS WOULD BE MOVING TO A NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY
SITUATION WHERE THERE WAS LESS NEED FOR PLANNING FOR

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EXTREME SITUATIONS. ADMITTEDLY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO
THINK OF THINGS LIKE THIS, BUT ONE SHOULD NOT OVER-
EMPHASIZE THEM. DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING ON ELSEWHERE
ALSO ON HOW TO MAKE THE SITUATION MORE SECURE. THE
ONLY REALISTIC WAY TO APPROACH THE PROBLEMS OF THE
PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO DO SO FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY.

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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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FROM US REP MBFR

EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO LISTEN TO WESTERN IDEAS
ON HOW TO DO THIS BETTER, BUT BOTH SIDES SHOULD APPRE-
CIATE THAT SOLUTIONS WHICH WERE INEQUITABLE AND DIMIN-
ISHED SECURITY WERE NOT REALISTIC ONES.

36. FRG REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD OBJECTED TO THE COMMON CEILING
BECAUSE IT DID NOT INCLUDE NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. IN PREVIOUS
SESSIONS ALLIES HAD PUT QUESTION WHETHER NON-INCLUSION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCES PROPOSAL WAS CENTRAL
REASON FOR EASTERN OBJECTION TO THE COMMON CEILING

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CONCEPT. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD NOT RESPONDED, SO ALLIES
COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THIS WAS NOT THE PROBLEM. SO IF
EAST REJECTED THE COMMON CEILING, IT WAS BECAUSE
EASTERN REPS MUST WISH TO PRESERVE THE UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE THEY NOW HAD. THIS POSITION WAS NOT CONDUSIVE TO
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW AND MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD
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BE DURABLE. MR. BREZHNEV HAD RECENTLY SAID THAT THE ACHIEVEMENTS
OF DETENTE SHOULD BE MADE IRREVERSIBLE. AN AGREEMENT MAINTAINING
THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THAT
OBJECTIVE. TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF EAST/WEST
CONFRONTATION, PARTICIPANTS NEEDED A SOLUTION BASED ON
PARITY AND THE REMOVAL OF DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS IN
ORDER TO CREATE AN ENDURING SOLUTION. EASTERN REPS
HAD REFERRED TO NUMBERS ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN FOR THE
GROUND FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT AND HAD
ALSO CONCLUDED THAT WEST HAD PROPOSED THREE-TIMES MORE
EASTERN REDUCTIONS THAN WESTERN REDUCTIONS. IF THESE
ALLIED FIGURES WERE CORRECT, AND ALLIES WERE SURE OF
THIS, THEN THEY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EAST DID HAVE A
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IF EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THE
FIGURES WERE INCORRECT, THEN EASTERN REPS HAD TO PROVE
THIS, AND TO PROVE IT, THEY HAD TO ADVANCE BETTER
FIGURES.

37. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER FRG REP'S REMARKS ABOUT AIR
AND NUCLEAR FORCES MEANT ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO ES-
TABLISH A COMMON CEILING FOR ALL OF THESE FORCE COM-
PONENTS. HE REPEATED, "WOULD ALLIES BE WILLING TO HAVE A COMMON
CEILING ON ALL THESE THINGS?" FRG REP SAID HIS INTEN-
SION HAD BEEN TO ELICIT REASONS FOR EASTERN OBJECTION
TO THE COMMON CEILING. WOULD EAST HAVE COMMON CEILING
ON MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND AIRCRAFT IN BOTH OF WHICH
THEY HAD MANY MORE THAN THE ALLIES? SMIRNOVSKY AGAIN
ASKED WHETHER ALLIES WERE PROPOSING COMMON CEILING ON
THESE ELEMENTS. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.
HE HAD WANTED TO FIND OUT WHAT EAST'S REAL OBJECTION
WAS TO THE COMMON CEILING.

38. SMINRNOVSKY SAID HE HAD WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE TO ALLIES
THAT THEY WANTED TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF FORCES TO
THEIR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS WAS THE OBJECTION.
ACCORDING TO EASTERN PROPOSAL, IF ONE SIDE HAS MORE
OF ONE FORCE ELEMENT, HE WOULD REDUCE MORE OF THAT
ELEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, EAST WOULD REDUCE MORE GROUND
FORCES; WEST WOULD REDUCE MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

39. CZECHOSLOVAK DEPREP SAID UK REP IN PLENARY STATEMENT
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EARLIER THAT DAY HAD WELCOMED THE IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/
WEST RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS. BUT THIS IMPROVEMENT
WAS THE RESULT OF THE EXISTING BALANCE OF MILITARY
POWER. THIS BALANCE MUST BE RETAINED FOR THE FUTURE.
THE IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL CONDITIONS DID NOT STEM FROM
DISPROPORTION IN MILITARY FORCES, BUT FROM THE PRESENT
EAST/WEST MILITARY BALANCE AND THAT WAS WHY EAST WISHED
TO RETAIN IT.

40. FRG REP SAID EASTERN REPS COULD NOT CLAIM THAT THE
PRESENT BALANCE OF FORCES HAD HELPED DETENTE. A POLITICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE BUT THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP CON-
TINUES TO BE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST, EVEN
MORE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST THAN IN THE PAST
PERIOD OF PEAK POLITICAL TENSION. IT WAS THE COMMON OBJECTIVE TO
EXTEND POLITICAL DETENTE TO THE MILITARY FIELD. THIS COULD BE
DONE ONLY IF MILITARY DETENTE, JUST AS WITH POLITICAL DETENTE,
WERE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND NOT BY PRESERVING
ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE.

41. US REP SAID IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT TO
CONSIDER ADJOURNING. ALLIED REPS HAD MADE A NEW
SUGGESTION. THEY HOPED EASTERN REPS WOULD THINK IT
OVER CAREFULLY BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING AND GIVE THEIR
RESPONSE AT THAT TIME. US REP PROPOSED THAT THE
NEXT MEETING BE ON THE MORNING OF MAY 28. EASTERN REPS
AGREED.

42. ON MARGIN OF INFORMAL SESSION, KHLESTOV TOLD U.S. REP
THAT HIS REQUEST TO LEAVE VIENNA, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY,
IN ORDER TO LEAD SOVIET DELEGATION TO LAW OF THE SEA
CONFERENCE, HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN BY MOSCOW. KHLESTOV
ALSO RAISED ISSUE OF WHETHER RECESS COULD NOT BE EXTENDED
TO COVER WHOLE OF SEPTEMBER, CLAIMING THAT
SOVIET LEADERS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION
IN AUGUST OR FIRST PART OF SEPTEMBER. STRULAK, MEISNER,
KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY ALL MADE INFORMAL REFERENCES TO
EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL, LATTER TWO IN
CONTEXT OF ARGUING THAT IF WEST WERE READY TO ENTER NO-INCREASE
COMMITMENT, IT SHOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT SYMBOLIC REDUCTION
PROPOSAL.HUMES
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